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Abstract
Cigarettes are highly taxed in Europe to discourage tobacco use and to fund public-health
measures to mitigate the harms from tobacco consumption. At higher prices some consumers substitute more toward illicit cigarettes. Illicit retail trade in cigarettes (IRTC) includes counterfeiting and smuggling—either of legally purchased products, from lowertax to higher-tax jurisdictions, or of entirely non-tax-paid cigarettes. Some existing literature includes claims that taxes are not an important factor determining the scale of IRTC.
We investigate these claims with data from the European Union. We find that while the
simple correlation between licit cigarette prices and the market share of illicit cigarettes
in consumption is negative, raising prices in any one country would lead to substantial
increases in the expected illicit market share and volume in that country. A one euro increase in tax per pack in a country is expected to increase illicit market share by 5 to 12
percentage points and increase illicit cigarette sales by 29% to 95% of the average consumption. The results are robust to a host of alternative specifications and sources of
data.

This is a pre-print version of the published article:
Prieger, James E., and Jonathan Kulick. “Cigarette taxes and illicit
trade in Europe.” Economic Inquiry 56, no. 3 (2018): 1706-1723.
All citations must be to the published version of the article.

I.

Introduction 1

Trade in tobacco products is subject to an array of taxes worldwide. The World Health Organization’s 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), a treaty to which 180
countries are party, embraces taxation as a central part of its demand reduction strategy. The European Union, whose countries are signatories to the FCTC, mandates minimum rates of excise
taxes on tobacco for member states. Although tobacco usage has fallen in recent decades, prevalence in European countries still ranges from about a quarter to a half of adults. 2 The taxes are
intended to discourage tobacco consumption and to raise revenue to fund public-health measures
aimed at tobacco control or mitigating the harmful effects of tobacco use. However, not all taxes
imposed are fully paid, since in many locations consumers can readily turn to the black market as
a substitute for licit tobacco products. In this study we investigate the determinants of illicit retail
trade in cigarettes (IRTC) in the EU, and find that raising the excise tax has large marginal effects on illicit market shares and quantities.
IRTC in Europe takes several forms, listed in order of prevalence: contraband genuine cigarettes smuggled in from lower price jurisdictions, whether by large-scale operators or by casual
bootlegging by consumers; “cheap whites,” brands produced mainly for black market sales, 3 and
counterfeit product (Transcrime, 2015). Our investigation focuses on large-scale organized
smuggling, cheap whites, and counterfeits, since casual bootlegging is not included in our data.
Since much of the literature focuses on casual bootlegging, 4 our exploration of organized smuggling is a near novelty. Estimates of the scope of the global illicit trade in tobacco products vary
widely, but an estimate on the order of $40 billion in annual lost tax revenue globally is generally
cited (Joossens & Raw, 2012). IRTC is approximately ten percent of the global retail market (see
Figure 1), with a strong upward trend in Western Europe since at least 1999 and in Eastern Europe more recently. These shares differ greatly by country, varying from near zero to over onehalf of all consumption in the data we introduce below.
The influence on IRTC of taxes and tax differentials between jurisdictions is hotly disputed. How taxation affects IRTC is of more than academic interest; if policymakers increase
cigarette tax rates in order to reduce consumption, the estimated impacts must account for consumption shifted to illicit cigarettes and the resulting lost tax revenue.
Some analysts find that prices weigh heavily on the incidence of smuggling. According to
Goel (2008, p. 591), in the United States “price inducements remain the main force behind
The authors acknowledge financial support from BOTEC Analysis, which was funded for this project by Cornerstone Research under contract to Altria Client Services. Neither Cornerstone nor Altria had any role in the writing of
the paper or exercised any editorial control.
2
Data for the EU from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2008 to 2013, show countrylevel rates for last-month prevalence of tobacco usage ranging from 24% to 47% among people 15-64 years of age.
Cigarettes are by far the most popular form of tobacco. See emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2015.
3
“Cheap whites” are cigarettes produced for the purpose of untaxed sales. As opposed to counterfeit product, cheap
whites are sold under their own brands, independent of the traditional tobacco manufacturers (Ross et al., 2015).
4
See, for example, the studies cited from the large empirical literature based on data from North America (referenced in section II.
1
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smuggling” and nonprice influences (own or border corruption) are statistically insignificant.
Others contend that prices matter little in determining the incidence of cigarette smuggling and
that other factors such as corruption are more important, particularly outside the United States
(Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka, 2000). Joossens and his coauthors, in numerous articles and
other outlets, have made the most vigorous claims that prices only minimally affect IRTC and
that other factors are more important (e.g., Joossens et al. 2009, 2014). Joossens is one of the
most highly visible commentators on tobacco taxes in the policy arena, and these arguments are
widely cited by health policy organizations and researchers working in the fields of health policy
and tobacco control. 5 The following statements from a recent handbook article in the field of tobacco control summarize well the intended lessons for policymakers offered by this literature:
“Price and tax differences have been shown not to be the main cause of smuggling…. [l]ittle relationship has been shown between the extent of smuggling of tobacco and its price or tax”
(Townsend, 2015, p.128). Similarly, a standard reference on the economics of tobacco control
for public health researchers states: “In contrast to the hypothesis that higher cigarette taxes and
prices will lead to increased illicit trade, the data suggest the opposite, with illicit market share
generally falling as cigarette prices rise” (US NCI, 2016, p.521).
These assertions, however, are counterintuitive; economic theory suggests that increasing
taxes in one jurisdiction, which—all else equal—increases the potential profit from evading
those taxes, should yield an increase in such evasion. Given the importance of the public-policy
issue and the frequent repetition of these assertions minimizing the role of taxes in stimulating
IRTC, these claims warrant careful consideration. We find that they are typically based on methods such as cross-sectional OLS regressions that are unlikely to identify the causal effects of
taxes on smuggling. In this paper we instead use panel data to estimate the relative contributions
of prices and other factors to the incidence of IRTC in countries of the European Union in recent
years. Our estimation methods include pooled OLS regressions, fixed effects estimations, and IV
regression.
We find that although IRTC is generally lower in European countries with lower prices, the
econometric evidence soundly rejects the assertion that prices and taxes are not a main cause of
smuggling. We show that market forces work exactly as predicted by microeconomic theory, after holding other things equal: fraud and tax evasion occurs because greater price differentials
between licit and illicit cigarettes cause some consumers to substitute toward the cheaper product. Our conclusion persists after controlling for corruption, and applies equally to illicit market
shares and illicit volumes. The estimated marginal effects of prices on IRTC are substantial.
Raising taxes within a single country by one euro per pack, and holding other factors equal, is
estimated to increase illicit market share by no less than one-third and perhaps more than 100%.
That means increasing the quantities of illicit cigarettes consumed by 29%–95%. The main findings are corroborated by a host of alternative econometric specifications and data on illicit trade.

Joossens has authored or co-authored at least 32 publications since 1991 on tobacco and illicit trade, and these
have over 1,600 citations per Google Scholar (as of yearend 2015).
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Our econometric study is novel as the only one using panel data and performed directly on
IRTC (i.e., with IRTC as the dependent variable) in Europe. Merriman et al. (2000), the only
other econometric study of European IRTC, use cross-sectional data, which we show is an important limitation that can lead to misleading results, and in any event examined data from well
before the FCTC. 6 Apart from that study, we are the only study to examine directly IRTC anywhere in the world. 7

II.

Policy setting and literature review

In addition to the direct loss of tax revenue, other negative consequences such as violence
and funding for terrorism may be associated with IRTC (Prieger & Kulick, 2014, 2015; Levi et
al., 2015; OECD, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2015). In the EU, the illicit cigarette market
was estimated to produce €10.5 billion in illicit revenue for criminals in 2012, which is comparable to the cocaine or heroin markets (Transcrime, 2015). Effective policymaking regarding tobacco therefore requires understanding how efforts at control may be undermined by illicit trade,
which has its own negative social consequences.
The principal claim in the literature that we test is that raising cigarette prices or taxes does
not tend to increase IRTC. For example, Joossens et al. (2014) state that “our data show that illicit trade is not directly related to tobacco prices.” This claim typically appears in the tobaccocontrol literature regarding countries other than the United States, for example Europe (Joossens
et al., 2014), Iran (Abdolahinia et al., 2013), and New Zealand (Ajmal and U, 2015). The studies
that reach such conclusions are often cross-sectional, may otherwise have inadequate controls for
confounding factors, or are based solely on visual inspection of the data. In many cases in the tobacco-control literature, the claimed insensitivity of illicit trade to prices is argued to follow directly from the fact that high-income countries in Europe (which tend to have higher taxes and so
more expensive cigarettes) tend to have lower levels of smuggling than lower-income countries. 8
A recent report by the National Research Council on IRTC acknowledges the relationship
between relative cigarette prices and illicit market share, stating that tax and price differences
among countries are “major drivers of bootlegging” in Europe (Reuter and Majmundar, 2015).
However, the report also cites Joossens et al. (2014) as finding that there are “no significant associations” between cigarette prices and the prevalence of IRTC.
Merriman et al. (2000) also indirectly explore ITTP with a few regressors related to bootlegging in panel data regressions of licit sales, and conclude that “[w]e can be quite confident that a policy that raises incentives for bootlegging (such as a tax increase) will significantly reduce domestic sales” (p. 379).
7
Stehr (2005) indirectly studies IRTC in the U.S., since he takes the log of the licit sales to total consumption ratio
as his dependent variable, which is the complement of our illicit market share variable. In the many other relevant
studies cited in the next section, ITTP-related variables appear as regressors in regressions of licit sales or total consumption.
8
For example, Joossens and Raw (1998, p.67) state that “If it [i.e., that smuggling is caused by large cigarette price
differences among countries] were true, however, countries with highly priced cigarettes would experience high levels of smuggling into them, whereas countries where cigarettes are cheap would not. In fact almost the opposite is
true.” They then show that are cigarettes were highly expensive in several European countries (such as Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom) with low smuggling rates.
6
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In contrast to the tobacco-control literature, studies by economists generally find the expected positive relationship between taxes and illicit trade. However, almost all such work uses
data from North America. The theoretical link between taxation and smuggling was set forth by
Norton (1988), who shows that the aggregate volume smuggled into a country is an increasing
function of the tax rate. When the tax rate rises, existing smugglers substitute supply away from
licit trade, and new smugglers located farther away from the border (and therefore with higher
transport cost) find it profitable to enter the market. A large empirical literature based on data
from North America finds that tobacco smuggling responds to prices as predicted (Baltagi &
Levin, 1986; Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Coats, 1995; Saba et al., 1995; Galbraith &
Kaiserman, 1997; Thursby & Thursby, 2000; Stehr, 2005; Chiou & Muehlegger, 2008; Goel,
2008; Lovenheim, 2008). 9 In contrast, there is far less econometric work examining the European or worldwide markets, and much of the work is cross-sectional (Merriman et al., 2000; Yurekli & Sayginsoy, 2010). Recent reviews of the state of research regarding IRTC cites the econometric literature regarding North America but names Merriman et al. (2000) as the only econometric study of Europe. 10 The present research helps fill this void in the literature, a task of importance for policymakers since the EU is a leader in raising tobacco taxes and the European experience is the main base for the claims that taxes do not much affect illicit trade.

III.

Data on the cigarette industry and smuggling

In this section we describe the data and provide summary statistics for illicit trade, prices,
taxes, and other market characteristics.

A.

Sources and construction of the data

All countries in the European Union are included in the study except Cyprus, Luxembourg,
and Malta, for which market data are unavailable. The data cover 1999 to 2014. For countries
joining the EU since 1999, only the years of membership are included (see Table A.1). Industry
statistics, including estimates of IRTC, come mainly from Euromonitor International’s Passport
database, vintage June 2015. These data have been widely used in reports for the European Commission and for academic studies. The advantages and weaknesses of these data are discussed in
section IV.C. However, we show below that the Euromonitor estimates of IRTC are highly correlated with data from an alternative source, and explore several robustness tests with alternative
data.
Key variables from Euromonitor include the number of cigarettes traded in the retail market within each country. Licit trade includes retail sales of duty-paid cigarettes, including legitimate sales for consumption in other countries. Illicit trade includes all cigarettes for which duty

9
In closely related work, Harding et al (2010) and DeCicca, Kenkel, & Liu (2013) show that the availability of
lower-tax cigarettes across borders creates significant differences in how consumer prices are affected by excise
taxes (because of casual bootlegging).
10
WHO (2010) states that “[ regard to econometric studies, there is no existing work on cigarette large-scale smuggling in Europe and only one of bootlegging (Merriman et al., 2000) [posed to large-scale smuggling]” (pp. 70-71).

4

has not been paid, and thus includes smuggled, gray-market, 11 and counterfeit cigarettes and any
produced domestically for black-market sales. 12 Legitimate cross-border sales (casual smuggling), which can be a form of legal tax avoidance, are excluded. From these two variables, our
main dependent variable is the market share for the illicit trade share. 13 The average licit cigarette price per stick is calculated as the total industry retail value of licit trade in cigarettes divided by total licit retail-trade volume. All monetary variables in the dataset are deflated to reflect the real prices in 2010 euros. 14
Data on cigarette excise taxes are from the European Commission 15 and include the specific excise tax per stick and the ad valorem excise tax as a percentage of the retail sales price. 16
Every country in the EU has both specific and ad valorem cigarette taxes. The tax components
are used to construct the total excise tax per stick, based on the average pre-tax price in each
country and year. 17 The total excise tax (both actual and the hypothetical tax used as an instrument) varies widely across countries and years. Additional information about these taxes is provided in the online appendix.18 How these variables are used as instruments is described in section IV.B.1 below.
Other variables are used to control for potentially confounding factors related to illicit trade
and consumption. Control of corruption is measured with an index from the World Bank. 19 The
measure “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain…
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2011, p. 223); higher values of this variable indicate less corruption in a country. The income
level of a country is measured with real Gross National Income from the World Bank. 20 The
Gray-market tobacco products are produced by a legitimate manufacturer for consumption in one jurisdiction, but
somewhere along the supply chain (often in free-trade zones) are diverted to another jurisdiction, sometimes without
the knowledge of the manufacturer.
12
Cheap whites (see footnote 3) may be consumed in the country of production, in which case taxes for local consumption are normally paid and the sales do not count toward the quantity of illicit trade for that country. Cheap
whites are often smuggled abroad, in which case they are part of the smuggled product counting toward illicit trade
in the receiving country (Joossens & Raw, 2012).
13
To the extent that illicit market share is mismeasured due to inaccurate estimates of the scale of the illicit market,
there will be additional variance in the econometric errors terms in the regressions and therefore larger standard errors for the estimated coefficients. However, as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with the regressors,
error in a dependent variable does not bias coefficient estimates.
14
The figures are originally denominated in current euros (using current exchange rates where needed), which are
then deflated using the relevant country’s CPI from the World Bank.
15
See Part III (Manufactured Tobacco) of the excise duty tables of the yearly Excise duties and transport, environment and energy taxes reports published by the European Commission Directorate General for the Taxation and
Customs Union.
16
A specific excise tax is levied as a fixed monetary amount per unit, while an ad valorem tax comes from a tax rate
applied to the pre-tax price of the good.
17
See section B in the Appendix for details.
18
The online appendix, Prieger and Kulick (2017), is available at https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/71/.
19
Data are from The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2016 Update, available from govindicators.org.; see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) for details. Data for 1999 and 2000 are linearly interpolated.
20
GNI data from the World Bank (calculated using the Atlas method) are in current US dollars. The figures are deflated using the relevant country’s CPI (base year 2010, data also from the World Bank) and then converted to euros
at that year’s average exchange rate (data from Euromonitor). Units are €1,000.
11
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definition and sources of these and other variables to be introduced below are presented in Table
A.2.

B.

Summary of the market and descriptive evidence

Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 1. IRTC, prices, and taxes all display
large variation in the data. The illicit market share of cigarettes averages about 10% and ranges
from virtually nil (0.4%, Italy in 2003) to over half the market (53.8%, Latvia in 2010). Prices
range from €0.056 in Latvia upon first joining the EU 21 to €0.476 in Ireland; prices are nearly as
high in the UK. Excise taxes average about 11 euro cents. Corruption and income range widely
across the EU but do not move in lockstep: Greece has middling income but high levels of corruption, while Lithuania and Poland have low income but middling levels of corruption.
There is no tight correlation between IRTC and taxes. Some countries have high prices and
taxes and little illicit trade. Prices and illicit market shares for EU countries in 2013 are plotted in
Figure 2 (the same figure with all the years is in Figure A.2). Denmark and Sweden have relatively high prices and the lowest rates of IRTC. On the other hand, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
have the highest levels of illicit market share, while having among the lowest prices in the EU.
The relation between prices and IRTC is mildly negative in the pooled data (see Figure A.2).
Of course, correlation in the pooled data does not answer the key question for policymakers: If a country were to raise cigarette prices by increasing the taxes, what would happen to illicit trade? There are many confounding factors across countries; consider what the data look like
when the country-specific time-averages of prices and the illicit market share are removed. The
positive correlation is obvious in Figure 3 for the within-transformed variables. While Figure 2
shows that the levels of prices and IRTC have little obvious relationship, Figure 3 indicates
clearly that increases in cigarette prices are associated with increases in IRTC. While the main
story is evident in Figure 3, additional regressions will be explored to control for possibly confounding factors that change over time as well as across countries, such as corruption, income,
and factors making prices potentially endogenous.

IV.

Estimation

This section presents the results of the estimations. In section A, regressions using the
pooled panel data are explored to show that the apparent negative correlation between prices and
IRTC is due to bias from omitting corruption and national income. Prices in other countries are
also found to be important determinants of IRTC. In section B, fixed-effects regressions using
panel data are employed to control for unobserved differences among countries that may affect
both prices and illicit activity. Results from a variety of regression specifications and methods,
including instrumental variables regression, show that raising prices indeed leads to more illicit
trade. In sections C and D, the robustness of the conclusions is verified by exploring alternative
specifications and measures of IRTC, prices, and taxes.
While EU regulations dictate a heavy minimum taxation of cigarettes, newly joining countries typically have a
few years to phase in the higher taxes.
21
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Identification of the price effects on illicit market shares varies according to the type of estimation. In the OLS regressions, identification requires 1) that all potentially confounding factors—factors that are correlated with illicit market share and the price variables of interest—be
included as regressors, 2) that the price variables be exogenous. Identification of the price effects
in the OLS regressions rests heavily on variation in prices and IRTC across countries. Since one
or both of the identification requirements is likely to fail, we also estimate fixed effects and IV
regressions. The fixed effects regressions remove the first potential problem, to the extent that it
is caused by country-specific unobserved factors. Identification in these models rests on withincountry changes in prices and IRTC. The fixed effect IV regressions additionally remove the second potential problem, as long as the instruments are valid. Instrument validity is discussed below. Linear IV estimates can be interpreted as a weighted average of local average treatment effects. Country/years where cigarette prices are the most responsive to changes in the instruments
(which are based on excise taxes) will have the largest effects on the magnitudes of the IV estimates. To the extent that places where prices are highly responsive to taxes are also places where
consumers’ desire for alternative sources of cigarettes is highly responsive to prices, the LATE
interpretation of IV helps explain why our IV estimates of the marginal effect of prices on IRTC
are larger than the fixed effects estimations.
Proper inference requires accounting for the clustering of observations within a country.
Since there are only 25 countries, standard asymptotic formulas for variance estimation with
clustering may result in biased inference. Accordingly, we base our inference on the wild cluster
bootstrap-T, which provides an asymptotic refinement over tests using critical values from the
normal distribution and can substantially reduce the bias of t-tests (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). 22

A.

Pooled regressions
1. Impact of licit price on illicit share

We begin the econometric investigation of the link between cigarette taxes and IRTC with
pooled OLS estimators. By pooling the data, unobserved differences among countries are ignored. Instead of examining taxes directly, the key regressor is the log of real cigarette prices,
under the assumption that consumers care about the total price of the product, not the composition of the price. In any event, taxes are the main driver of variation in prices; 93.4% of the variation in real cigarette prices is explained by variation in taxes (see Figure A.3).
A simple regression of illicit share on the log of real cigarette prices, the results of which
are labeled OLS 2.1 in Table 2, finds the line of best fit (shown in Figure A.2) through the scatterplot of the bivariate data. The estimated price coefficient is negative but small (–0.05) and insignificant. However, the identification of the impact of prices on IRTC is not convincing in this
specification; given the heavy reliance of cross-sectional variation and the lack of controls, it tacitly assumes that raising prices turns Latvia into Sweden.
22

Bootstrapping was performed using the boottest add-on command (Roodman, 2015) in Stata 15.
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Given the likely omitted variables bias in this regression, we first add control of corruption
as an additional regressor in estimation OLS 2.2 (Table 2). Since countries with less corruption
such as the Scandinavian countries have lower IRTC than more corrupt countries such as some
in Eastern Europe, some authors argue that corruption is a more important determinant of IRTC
than are cigarette prices, (Merriman et al., 2000; Joossens et al., 2000, 2009). The coefficient on
control of corruption is indeed negative and statistically significant while the price variable remains insignificant.
However, corruption is correlated with characteristics of the country that are omitted from
the regression. In particular, control of corruption is positively correlated with the country’s income level (r = 85%), and income likely affects the IRTC share. Income in levels and squares is
added in estimation OLS 2.3. The impact of income on IRTC share is negative, as to be expected
if illicit product is an inferior good. 23 With income in the regression, the corruption variable
loses significance and the impact of price on IRTC turns positive (though still not significant). 24
Regression OLS 2.3 suggests that controlling corruption by itself is no guarantee that illicit trade
will fall, and the fixed effects estimations in the next section show that the evidence for the link
between prices and illicit trade is much stronger. Despite the insignificance of the corruption coefficient corruption it is included in the regressions to follow given the importance ascribed to it
in the literature as a proposed alternative driver of IRTC.
2. Impact of IRTC-relevant factors in other countries

Cigarette prices in other countries are also expected to be correlated with IRTC in the home
country. IRTC is an economic activity that depends not only on prices in the home country but
also on other factors that affect the incentive for smugglers to import illicit cigarettes (Norton,
1988; Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby, 1991). Some such factors are the difference in prices of
cigarettes between the home and other countries and the distance to countries with lower prices.
If raising the price in the home country did not in fact have anything to do with increasing domestic IRTC, then after controlling for the domestic price, prices in and distances to other countries should have no effect on the IRTC share. For example, as noted by Baltagi and Levin
(1986), if taxes do not lead to bootlegging, then tax rates and prices in other places should not
affect consumption.
Many IRTC-relevant variables reflecting conditions outside the home country have been
proposed in the literature (Baltagi & Levin, 1986; Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Saba et
al., 1995; Stehr, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2000; Merriman et al., 2000; Chiou & Muehlegger,
2008; Goel, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008). We computed many alternatives to show that the regression results are generally similar regardless of which measures are included (see the section on
robustness checks); for illustrative purposes the maximum real price difference per km between
the home country and any other European country in the dataset (whether or not the other
The marginal effect of income is U-shaped overall but is negative across the range of income found in the sample.
One may worry about collinearity between corruption and income. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for control
of corruption in regression OLS 2.3 is 3.6; the most common rule of thumb suggests that VIFs above 10 indicate
cause for concern about near multicollinearity.
23
24
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country is in the EU) 25 is included as a regressor in place of the home price in estimation OLS
2.4. Since this variable is larger the greater the relative price in the home country, we expect the
coefficient to be positive if price differentials with other locations lead to smuggling. The regression results show that the coefficient has the expected sign and is statistically significant. The implied elasticity of illicit market share with respect to these price differences is 0.88.

B.

Fixed-effect panel regressions

Fixed-effect panel regressions allow us to control for unobserved country-specific factors
that may bias the OLS price coefficients. There are many country-specific unobserved factors
that might be correlated with illicit market shares and cigarette prices. Attitudes about illegal behavior, enforcement against smuggling and illicit trade, and travel distances to major sources of
illicit supply are all examples. While these factors may change over time, much of the variation
is likely to be between countries and not within a single country. In such cases, fixed-effects regression removes the impact of differing within-country averages on IRTC that would bias estimates from a cross-sectional or pooled regression.
1. Illicit market share and cigarette prices

Table 3 contains several fixed-effects regressions of the IRTC share on cigarette prices.
The first estimation, labeled FE 3.1, is otherwise identical to the specification of pooled estimation OLS 2.3. Correcting for omitted factors increases the magnitude of the price coefficient,
which is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of 0.170 in this linear-log regression means
that a 10% increase in the real cigarette price is associated with an increased illicit market share
of approximately 1.7 percentage points. The implied average price elasticity of illicit market
share is 3.4. 26 As before, there is no statistical significance of corruption.
There may be trends across all countries that lead to spurious correlation between prices
and IRTC even after controlling for unobserved country factors. For example, prices generally
rose across the EU after 2004, as shown in Figure 4, 27 and the overall trend for IRTC share is upward during the entire period. To remove any association between prices and IRTC that stems
merely from spurious correlation of trending variables, year fixed effects are added to estimation
FE 3.2 in Table 3. The size of the price coefficient increases slightly and is significant at the 5%
level. The implied average price elasticity of illicit market share in the sample is 3.5— a sizeable
effect. Trends specific to each country may also induce spurious correlation between prices and
IRTC. In estimation FE 3.3, the addition of controls for country-specific linear time trends lowers the price coefficient, reducing the elasticity to a still-large 2.5, while retaining significance.
Even after controlling for time- and country-specific omitted factors, the coefficient on the
cigarette price might not reflect a causal impact on IRTC. In particular, there are three reasons
The Euromonitor data cover 37 countries in Europe (including Russia and Turkey). We also included Algeria
since it has the lowest prices and is estimated to have the highest outflow of illicit cigarettes of the North African
countries (KPMG, 2017).
26
The elasticity is calculated as the sample average of 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 /𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 .
27
Average price in the EU fell in 2004 due to the admittance of several Eastern European countries that had lower
cigarette prices. See footnote 21.
25
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why the price coefficient in the previous regressions is potentially downward biased. First, given
that price is measured as average revenue, there is measurement error in this regressor. While using average revenue for price is standard in demand studies with aggregated data, it necessarily
means that the actual price in any single transaction may differ from the average. Measurement
error in a regressor leads to attenuation bias in its coefficient. Second, there may be remaining
unobserved factors that bias the price coefficient due to endogeneity. Because licit and illicit cigarettes are substitutes, a positive demand shock for smuggled cigarettes may lower the equilibrium price of licit product. This would create a downward bias on the licit price coefficient.
Third, it is possible that there is reverse causality between illicit trade and tax rates if the tobacco
industry used rising IRTC to successfully lobby for lower taxes. This would create spurious negative correlation between IRTC and prices and therefore downward bias in a positive price coefficient. However, two pieces of evidence (explored in the appendix, section A) make it appear
unlikely that reverse causality could materially affect the results. First, taxes generally rose or
stayed level in each country in our sample. Second, regressions similar to the main panel estimations but with the excise tax instrument (described below) regressed on lagged illicit market
share show no evidence of the negative coefficient implied by such reverse causality. Since some
of these regressions include country-specific trends, they also cover the case where tax officials
may have responded to high IRTC by raising taxes but by less than they otherwise would have.
To correct for endogeneity, we estimated a fixed-effects instrumental variables (IV) regression using cigarette-specific tax instruments. It is common to instrument cigarette prices with excise taxes (e.g., Gruber, Sen, & Stabile, 2003; Stehr, 2005; Nonnemaker et al., 2009). The cigarette-specific tax instrument we construct is the hypothetical total excise tax (in real euros) that
would be levied on a cigarette with pre-tax price equal to the average in the sample. Excise taxes
on cigarettes in the EU consist of a fixed amount per pack (the “specific” tax) and an ad valorem
component. Details of the calculation of the hypothetical total excise tax are in the appendix
(section B), as is strong evidence that the relationship between the instrument and prices is monotonic (see Figure A.5). The log hypothetical excise tax is highly relevant instrument: its correlation with log real cigarette prices is 0.86. The hypothetical tax is calculated based on a constant
pre-tax price for all observations to avoid endogeneity from using the actual, potentially endogenous prices in the formula. The hypothetical excise tax can be viewed as a particular nonlinear
combination of the specific and ad valorem tax rates; using these variables as separate instruments instead yields similar results.
Results are presented from two-stage least squares estimation, although alternative IV estimators yield substantially similar results. 28 In first-stage regressions of log prices on the instruments and the exogenous regressors, the coefficients for the instruments are all positive as expected (see Table A.4). The instruments appear to be strong and exogenous. 29
28
The alternative estimation methods include two-step efficient GMM estimation, LIML, and Fuller’s LIML. The
price coefficients varied among methods by no more than a few thousandths.
29
The F statistic on the excluded instruments is 66.6 when the hypothetical total excise tax is used and 35.1 when
the specific tax, the ad valorem tax rate, and their cross product are used as instruments. The Sargan-Hansen statistic
has a p-value of 0.81 in the latter, and so the test fails to find any evidence that the instruments are invalid due to
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The IV results are in Table 3, labeled IV 3.1 (when the instruments is the log hypothetical
excise tax) and IV 3.2 (when the tax rate components are the instruments). As expected, when
the downward bias from endogeneity is removed, the price coefficient rises compared to the
fixed effects regressions. The price coefficients of 0.395 and 0.423 imply that a 10% increase in
cigarette prices causes illicit market share to rise by about 4.0 to 4.2 percentage points. At the
mean illicit share, that would be an increase from 10.0% of the market to 14.0–14.2%. Stated another way, the 10% increase in cigarette prices would lead to about a 40% increase in illicit market share. The implied elasticity of illicit market share with respect to real cigarette prices is 7.9
to 8.4. These appear to be large effects.
2. Impact of licit price on illicit quantities

The preceding sections have established that raising prices or taxes on cigarettes increases
the market share of illicit cigarettes by an appreciable amount. However, illicit market share can
increase even as the actual number of illicit cigarettes smoked decreases. Thus an increase in
taxes could, in theory, lead to both a higher illicit market share and a lower illicit level of consumption (Stoklosa, 2015). To investigate, we repeat the estimations from Table 3 with the new
dependent variable of illicit quantities instead of shares. In particular, the dependent variable is
the log of the quantity of illicit cigarettes. Note that differences in the population of countries are
largely absorbed into the country fixed effects, and in any event the log-log specification implies
that impacts are in percentage terms. 30
The results, shown in Table 4, demonstrate that the results above are not merely an artifact
of using illicit market shares instead of quantities. First, note that the price coefficients in the illicit quantity estimations are all positive and that three of the four are significant at the 5% level.
The price coefficient now attains significance at the 1% level in IV 4.1. Also, note that the size
of the impact is not small. The price coefficients range from 1.0 to 2.4. These elasticities imply
that, at the sample average price of €0.186/stick, a 10% price increase would be associated with
an increase in illicit cigarettes sold of 7.5% to 25.4%. At the sample average of 2.524B illicit
sticks/year within a country, those figures represent between 190M and 641M additional illicit
cigarettes traded per year per country on average.

C.

Alternative measures of illicit trade

The Euromonitor data on IRTC, although widely used, are not the only comprehensive data
on illicit cigarettes available for Europe. In this section we discuss the relative advantages of the
various ways to measure IRTC and explore two alternative ways to estimate the impact of prices

endogeneity. A referee questioned whether the exogeneity assumption would fail to hold due to a connection between the instruments and disposable income. Adding real disposable income as an additional regressor in IV 3.1
below barely changes the resulting coefficients, the strength of the instrument, or the conclusion from the exogeneity
test.
30
If the dependent variable is changed to the log of illicit quantity divided by the number of persons of legal smoking age in the country, the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from estimations FE 4.1 and 4.2 and the
significance levels are identical.
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on IRTC. The first uses data from a consulting firm, and the second involves a “gap analysis”
based on differences between stated and actual tobacco consumption.
The Euromonitor data provide a large panel of consistently-defined variables from which
illicit shares can be computed. The data have been used in previous reports for the European
Commission and its Executive Agencies (Pedersen et al., 2014). Stoklosa (2015) of the American
Cancer Society, who criticizes the Euromonitor data elsewhere, states: “Although there are some
concerns around the reliability of Euromonitor illicit trade data, no other comparable global data
exist” (p. 1). However, Euromonitor does not disclose exact methodology for its estimates of the
illicit tobacco market, but says that it uses “on-the-ground analysis” as well as “interview and
secondary research including estimates made by governments (customs agencies, revenue departments, etc.), estimates based on seizures of illicit cigarettes, as well as by companies using
other means of estimation, such as discarded, or empty pack surveys” (Euromonitor, 2014b, p.3).
Euromonitor also provides a list of sources consulted while developing each country’s estimates. 31
Euromonitor’s data on illicit tobacco have been questioned by some researchers (e.g.,
Stoklosa and Ross, 2013; Blecher et al., 2015; van Walbeek & Shai, 2015), although usually not
regarding Europe. 32 The main criticisms leveled against the Euromonitor data by tobacco-control
advocates is that for some countries the estimates are overstated and that there are instances in
which the data for a country are revised retrospectively without explanation. From the evidence
presented in Blecher et al. (2015) it appears that the form of the revisions is typically to adjust
the level of the past trend without changing the shape of the trend much. To the extent that this is
generally the case, our fixed-effect estimations remove any bias in the regression estimates
caused by incorrect levels of the trends. And, as a report for the European Commission (Pedersen
et al., 2014) noted: “Due to the market’s contentious nature, various parties have vested interests
in either deflating or inflating illicit trade figures, though Euromonitor strives to present the most
accepted and realistic estimate of the market”(p. 39). 33
The UK consulting firm KPMG LLP makes available another set of estimates of IRTC for
the E.U. Since 2006, the KPMG has produced its series of Project Star and Project Sun reports. 34
The reports are funded by Philip Morris International, the largest producer of cigarettes sold in
Europe, pursuant to a legal agreement with the EU. Despite the fact that the KPMG estimates of
31
For example, five governmental sources are listed for the UK data (Eurostat, Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, HM Customs & Excise, HMRC - Statistics Illicit, and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service), five trade associations, eight publications from the trade press, 29 company sources, and five other sources. However, no individual statistic in the data is linked to a particular source.
32
These criticisms involve the estimates for South Africa, Mexico, Guatemala, the United Arab Emirates, and Bulgaria. Only the last of these is in our data.
33
The report further mentions that “Euromonitor’s business model depends on its provision of non-biased data that
are as accurate as possible. The data have been used in previous reports for the European Commission and its Executive Agencies” (Ramboll, 2014, p.29).
34
See Gilmore et al. (2014) for background on the reports. The earlier reports are not publicly available; we examined copies under arrangement from Altria Client Services. Data from the reports on illicit consumption during
2006-2013, however, are reproduced in Table 1 of the annex to Transcrime (2015), available at transcrime.it/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/Methodological-Annex.pdf.
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illicit trade are used by the European Commission and national governments, their accuracy is
contested by some tobacco-control researchers (e.g., Gilmore et al., 2014). Since these data have
been criticized for being provided under contract to the tobacco industry, and are not available
before 2006, we do not rely on them for our main estimations. However, these alternative data
provide additional corroborating evidence for our main conclusions. 35
In the regressions using the KPMG data, the dependent variable is the share of counterfeit
and contraband consumption out of total consumption. 36 The new variable is highly correlated (r
= 0.78) with illicit market share computed from the Euromonitor data, and the imperfect correlation shows that the latter data do not simply rely solely on the industry-funded Project Sun/Star.
The estimations here employ price data from the KPMG reports as well, instead of the prices
from Euromonitor. 37 The repetition of the main estimations (FE 3.1, FE 3.2, IV 3.1, and IV 3.2)
from Table 3 with the illicit market share and price data from KPMG yields the analogous estimations summarized in Table 5 and reported in full in Table A.6. Due to smaller sample size, not
all estimates are significant at the 5% level. In each case, however, the coefficients are positive.
These results thus strengthen—or at least provide no evidence against—the conclusions found
above. The elasticities from the fixed effects regressions are a bit higher (compared to the same
regressions with the Euromonitor data); the elasticities from the IV regressions are lower (but
still higher than the previous fixed effects results).
We also explore a third measure of IRTC. To complement the estimations using the Euromonitor and KPMG data, we calculated our own estimates of illicit market share. Our consumption gap analysis has the advantage of avoiding industry- and third-party estimates of IRTC
that lack fully transparent methodology. Following the approach suggested by Blecher (2010),
we compare survey estimates of total cigarette consumption within each country to the amount of
licit sales and ascribe gaps between the two to consumption of illicitly obtained cigarettes. Consumption estimates are the Eurobarometer (various years) surveys. The estimation of the marginal effects of the regressors accounts for an unobserved degree of underreporting in stated consumption, which is a well-known feature of survey responses to questions about smoking. The
marginal effect of prices can be identified either to scale with other coefficients (so that only the
statistical significance but not the magnitude of the marginal effect can be assessed) or, by making use of external objective (non-self-reported) estimates of consumption, to an exact level.
Construction of the data and the analysis contains many steps, which are detailed the appendix
(section D). The results (summarized in Table 5 and presented in full in Table A.11) provide further evidence that licit cigarette prices have statistically significant positive impacts on illicit
market share. The marginal effects of price on the IRTC share by this method, when their levels
Transcrime (2015) notes that “despite the concerns raised by the literature, KPMG data are the best available data
on the illicit cigarette market in the EU” and “…the national estimates produced by Project Star and Project Sun are
at present the most reliable sources….” Transcrime also asserts that estimates not from the tobacco industry are
based on smaller samples, rely on surveys that have underreporting biases, and are not available annually.
36
KPMG defines contraband similarly to Euromonitor, except that the former includes inflows that exceed legal
border limits even if taxes were paid in another country.
37
Given that the correlation between the price variables from the two sources is 0.986, it makes little difference to
the results which is used in the regressions here.
35
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are identified by using external estimates of consumption, are estimated to be somewhat larger
than our main results above, although we discuss in the appendix why there may be some upward bias.

D.

Other robustness checks

This section reports results from many robustness checks to confirm the conclusions of the
previous estimations. 38
1. The separate impacts of cigarette prices and taxes

In theory, consumers care not about the components of the cigarette price but just the outof-pocket total price. Nevertheless, here we explore including taxes directly in the regression
specifications, following, e.g., Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2010). Even though consumers may not be sensitive to the division of retail price into tax and other components, suppliers of
illicit cigarettes probably are. Taxes can be fully avoided by illicit supply, whereas the non-tax
part of the price reflects local cost conditions that may affect illicit traffickers as well. For the latter reason, if any difference in impacts is to be found, we expect that taxes have more impact on
IRTC than the non-tax part of the final price.
The new regressors are the total excise tax per stick and the price including VAT but excluding excise taxes. The results (see Table A.5 in the appendix) show that the marginal effects
of tobacco-specific taxes are more important the rest of the price, both numerically and in terms
of significance. The implied tax elasticity of illicit market share is 3.2, which is similar to the total-price elasticities from FE 3.1 and 3.2. On the other hand, the non-tax part of the price has an
insignificant coefficient and an associated elasticity of only 0.48. Treating the price or tax as endogenous does not materially affect the results (as discussed in the appendix).
2. Weighted estimation

Some researchers use weighted least squares (WLS) to improve the performance of crosscountry regressions. The difference between the unweighted and WLS estimates can also be used
as a diagnostic for model misspecification (i.e., misspecification of the conditional mean by not
including relevant regressors or through incorrect functional form; Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge,
2015). 39 In estimation FE A6.1 in Table A.6, estimation FE 3.2 is repeated using the number of
persons aged 15 and up (data from World Bank) as weights. The results show that even though
the price coefficient is a bit smaller than in FE 3.2, it has a higher significance level. Given the
small difference in price coefficients (0.175 vs. 0.167), there is no strong evidence that WLS estimation is needed to correct bias in the unweighted estimations or that the regression specification is incorrect.

The working paper also contains additional robustness tests not mentioned here.
If the regression specification for the mean is correct, then WLS and unweighted estimation are both consistent
and employing weights should not materially change the results.
38
39
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3. Alternative regressors

There are many other control variables that can be used in place of the particular measure
of corruption employed above. We repeat estimation OLS 2.3 with several alternative measures
of corruption. The alternatives include corruption measures from Transparency International, indices of a country’s rule of law and the effectiveness of government from the World Bank, and
United Nations data on police per capita. See the appendix (section E) for information on these
variables and regressions employing them. Using these alternative regressors made virtually no
impact on price coefficient or its significance.
There are also many IRTC-relevant factors in other countries that can be used in place of,
or in addition to, the maximum price difference per km between countries (the regressor from
OLS 2.4). These include the distance to countries with lower prices, distance to criminal hubs,
maximum price differentials or ratios between countries, and other similar measures. Results for
these regressors are in the appendix (section F). The results of all the alternative estimations and
tests reported there strongly support the conclusion that higher licit prices and price differentials
with other locations lead to higher illicit market shares due to smuggling.

V.

Policy discussion and conclusions

Table 6 summarizes the results of the main regressions. IRTC is highly responsive to licit
cigarette prices. The price elasticities range from 2.5 to 8.0 for illicit share and from 0.8 to 2.5
for illicit quantity. In all cases for the latter, the confidence interval for the elasticity admits the
elastic region (greater than one). The table also shows the estimated effects of €1/pack tax increase within a single country. A regression with country and year fixed effects (and no other regressors; results not shown) shows that a €1/pack tax increase may be expected to raise prices by
€1.13/pack on average. Remarkably similar tax pass-through rates for cigarettes were also found
in US markets by Keeler et al. (1996) and Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012); pass-through was
1.11 in the former study and 1.07 to 1.14 in the latter. Our estimate is also between the bounding
estimates of Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) for cigarette tax pass-through in European markets. 40 That price increase, coupled with the fitted models in Table 3 and Table 4, allows calculation of the expected change in illicit market share or illicit cigarette quantities.
The estimates are calculated as the average of the discrete changes in the dependent variable in the sample (details of the calculation are in the appendix, section G). The price increase is
associated with an expected 2.5 to 3.5 percentage points of illicit market share from the fixedeffects regressions (see the first three rows of Table 6). These are large increases when compared
to the average illicit share of 10.0% in the sample. If the IV regression estimates are used instead
for the calculations, the implied impact is between 7.9 and 8.4 percentage points. The price increase is estimated from the fixed-effects regressions to lead to additional illicit sales of between
These authors split their sample into two groups, one of which had ad valorem pass-through of 0.7 and specificexcise pass-through of 0.9, while a second group had ad valorem pass-through of 1.5 and specific-excise passthrough of 2.2. Our estimate of the total excise pass-through (1.1) lies within these bounds, as would be expected
due to our averaging across countries and tax types.
40

15

735 and 739 million cigarettes within a country and year; the IV estimates are an additional 2.0
to 2.4 billion sticks. Again, these are large impacts compared to the average illicit volume of 2.5
billion sticks—increases of 29% to 95% of the average.
In conclusion, we find that while the overall correlation between licit cigarette prices and
illicit market share is negative, raising prices in any one country would lead, ceteris paribus, to
substantial increases in the expected illicit market share and volume. Controlling for corruption
does not substantially change the role of prices in stimulating IRTC, at least in the European data
examined here. Finally, the same general conclusions about the importance and impact of prices
on IRTC hold whether examining illicit market shares or illicit volumes.
It is also important to note that the impacts of raising prices that we estimate are for a country unilaterally raising its tax. Since the work above showed that price differentials among countries affect IRTC, raising prices to harmonize them across the EU would involve competing effects on illicit activity: raising prices would tend to increase IRTC while eliminating price differentials among countries would tend to reduce it.
This analysis addresses only one consideration in determining how cigarettes should be
taxed. Evidence from other studies strongly suggests that, within the range of empirical experience, higher taxes bring in greater revenue despite their intended effect of decreasing smoking
and their unintended effect of increasing smuggling (Chaloupka, Yurekli, & Fong, 2012). Our
estimates do not contradict those results, but highlight that some potential tax revenue is lost to
the illicit market. Furthermore, the econometric results are for the expected impacts on illicit
trade of raising prices while holding all else fixed, and do not speak to direct or indirect effects
of other policy measures that may change when raising taxes. Policymakers need not (and should
not) leave enforcement and other activity designed to further compliance unchanged if they intend to increase taxes. In any case, the impact on illicit trade is only one aspect of policy analysis
of increasing cigarette prices. A complete cost-benefit analysis of tax policy toward tobacco
would include the expected impacts on tax revenue and public health in addition to the unintended consequences examined here.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable

Mean

S.d.

Minimum

Maximum

Illicit market share

0.104

0.092

0.004

0.538

Illicit cigarette quantity

2,533.7

2,803.1

57.00

14,828.2

Cigarette price per stick

0.188

0.085

0.056

0.476

Specific excise tax per stick
Ad valorem tax rate (% of retail
sales price)
Excise tax per stick

51.061

49.524

3.827

230.214

33.277

15.189

0.950

58.430

0.110

0.054

0.017

0.284

Hypothetic excise tax per stick
Max. price difference with other
European country/km
Income (real GNI per capita)

0.111

0.045

0.020

0.260

3.68E-4

3.27E-4

3.08E-4

1.77E-3

24.000

11.339

4.197

46.598

Control of corruption
1.163
0.835
-0.303
2.586
Data cover years 1999 to 2014; N = 327. Variables entering regressions in logs are shown in levels here.
For additional variables used in robustness tests, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.

Table 2: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices
OLS 2.1

OLS 2.2

OLS 2.3

OLS 2.4

Y = illicit market share

Coefficient
(p-value)

Coefficient
(p-value)

Coefficient
(p-value)

Coefficient
(p-value)

Log(real cigarette price)

-0.048
[0.258]

0.002
[0.962]

0.081
[0.124]

-0.041**
[0.039]

0.003
[0.858]
-0.015***
[0.008]
1.98E-4**
[0.031]
0.474***
[0.001]
4.26
0.277
0.268
327

Log(max. price difference/KM)
Control of corruption
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
constant
F statistic
R2
Adjusted R2
N

0.019
[0.791]
1.71
0.051
0.049
327

0.156
[0.187]
3.23
0.136
0.131
327

0.044***
[0.007]
-0.007
[0.741]
-0.013**
[0.021]
1.90E-4**
[0.042]
0.661***
[0.000]
3.92
0.317
0.308
327

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Note: p-values (in square brackets) are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap of the t statistic (3999 repetitions, with the null imposed; see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008),
and account for clustering by country.
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Table 3: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices
Y = illicit market share
Log(real cigarette price)
Corruption
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
Implied price elasticity
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Country-specific linear time trends
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments
Hansen J statistic (p-value)
N

FE 3.1
Country fixed
effects (FE)
0.170***
[0.001]
0.015
[0.589]
-0.009
[0.349]
1.06E-4
[0.392]
3.389
Y
N
N

327

FE 3.2
Country FE +
Year FE

FE 3.3
Country FE +
Country
Trends

0.175**
[0.019]
0.017
[0.709]
-0.009*
[0.082]
9.13E-5
[0.235]
3.492
Y
Y
N

0.126**
[0.038]
0.031
[0.520]
-0.007
[0.108]
7.67E-5
[0.236]
2.507
Y
Y
Y

327

327

IV 3.1
Instrument:
Total tax
0.395**
[0.014]
-0.031
[0.618]
-0.019**
[0.034]
3.05E-4*
[0.057]
7.896
Y
Y
N
66.59
327

IV 3.2
Instruments:
Tax components
0.423**
[0.012]
-0.037
[0.564]
-0.020**
[0.031]
3.31E-4*
[0.057]
8.440
Y
Y
N
35.06
0.814
327

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Note: p-values (in square brackets) are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap (see notes to previous table). In estimation IV 3.1, the instruments for price are the hypothetical total excise tax as described in the text; in IV 3.2 instruments are the ad valorem excise tax rate, the specific
tax rate, and their product. The IV estimation method is two-stage least squares.
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Table 4: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC quantities on cigarette prices
Y = log illicit cigarette quantity
Log(real cigarette price)
Freedom from Corruption (WGI)
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000)
GNI per capita squared
Implied price elasticity
Country fixed effects
Year fixed effects
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments
Hansen J statistic (p-value)
N

FE 4.1

FE 4.2

Country fixed
effects (FE)

Country FE
+ Year FE

0.951**
[0.025]
-0.047
[0.802]
-0.067
[0.213]
9.38E-4
[0.228]
0.951
Y
N

327

0.956*
[0.077]
0.031
[0.960]
-0.063*
[0.057]
5.99E-4
[0.353]
0.956
Y
Y

327

IV 4.1

IV 4.2

Instrument:
total tax

Instruments: Tax
components

2.142***
[0.008]
-0.227
[0.592]
-0.119***
[0.008]
1.75E-3**
[0.048]
2.142
Y
Y

2.398**
[0.036]
-0.283
[0.586]
-0.132**
[0.024]
1.69E-3*
[0. 096]
2.398
Y
Y

66.59

35.06

327

0.292
327

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SEs (in parentheses) account for clustering by country.

Note: p-values (in square brackets) are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap (see notes to Table 2). The IV estimations and instruments are as
described in the notes to Table 3. The coefficients for log price are elasticities.
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Table 5 Regressions using alternative data sources for IRTC share
KPMG data on IRTC
Regression specification similar
to…
FE 3.1 (country FE)
FE 3.2 (country FE + Year FE)
IV 3.1 (instrument: total tax)
IV 3.2 (instruments: tax components)

Coef. on
log price
(asy. stars)
0.148*
0.192*
0.233*
0.256**

Wild
bootstrap
p-value
0.019
0.041
0.222
0.153

Gap analysis
Elasticity
3.45
4.49
5.47
6.03

Sign and significance
of log price coef. when
identified to scale
+**
+***

Coef. on
log price
0.406**
0.558**

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note: Results here are drawn from the complete regression results shown in Table A.6 and Table A.11. Significance stars are computed from the
usual asymptotic sandwich estimator for clustered data; wild bootstrap p-values are provided for comparison for the first set of regressions but are
unavailable for the nonlinear SUR regressions for the gap analysis. Refer to discussion in the appendix (section D) for explanation of the gap analysis and its results.
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Table 6 Estimated impact of a €1/pack tax increase
Illicit share

Price Elasticity

Increase in illicit share

Average in
sample

Point estimate
(average in
sample)

95% confidence
interval*

Point estimate
(average in
sample)

95% confidence
interval*

FE 3.1

0.104

3.389

[1.30, 6.06]

0.048

[0.018, 0.085]

FE 3.2

0.104

3.492

[0.36, 8.17]

0.049

[0.005, 0.115]

FE 3.3

0.104

2.507

[0.11, 5.39]

0.035

[0.002, 0.076]

IV 3.1

0.104

7.896

[1.13, 15.11]

0.111

[0.016, 0.212]

IV 3.2

0.104

8.440

[1.37, 16.71]

0.118

[0.019, 0.235]

Estimation

Illicit quantity

Increase in illicit quantity

FE 4.1

2,533.7

0.951

[0.18, 1.66]

735.1

[120.7, 1446.8]

FE 4.2

2,533.7

0.956

[-0.11, 2.07]

739.6

[-73.6, 1942.5]

IV 4.1

2,533.7

2.142

[0.43, 3.34]

2,042.6

[304.6, 4023.9]

IV 4.2

2,533.7

2.398

[0.48, 3.80]

2,399.9

[343.7, 5029.2]

*The confidence interval for the increases in illicit share and quantity are derived from the bootstrap confidence intervals for the price
coefficient. See text for details.
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Figure 3: Country-demeaned cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 1999-2014
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Note: For each country, the average of the time-series of each variable has been subtracted from the data.
The line of best fit (slope = 0.83) is calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 2.
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